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Introduction 
Transhumanism is undoubtedly one of the most important – and most 
controversial – intellectual movements of the early 21st century. It’s reception of 
the development of biological and computational sciences, as well as the 
hopeful perspectives it offers, proves how universally important for all 
humanity are such topics as individual perfection, cultural development, and 
relations between progress in science and their social reception and 
application. However, the transhumanist perspective on how to benefit from 
new technologies (i.e., life extension, enhancing human capabilities, etc.) 
remains highly controversial, as far as to be called the modern world’s most 
dangerous idea by Francis Fukuyama: “The environmental movement has 
taught us humility and respect for the integrity of nonhuman nature. We need a 
similar humility concerning our human nature. If we do not develop it soon, we 
may unwittingly invite the transhumanists to deface humanity with their 
genetic bulldozers and psychotropic shopping malls” (Fukuyama 2009). Most 
transhumanists disagree with Fukuyama voice, stating that “the only real 
danger posed by transhumanism, it seems, is that people on both the left and 
the right may find it much more attractive than the reactionary 
bioconservatism proffered by Fukuyama or Leon Kass” (Bostrom 2004). 
The “reactionary bioconservatism” Bostrom writes of is often linked 
with religious – and precisely Christian – thinking and philosophy (see e.g. 
IEET chart on biopolitics). In general, the Catholic church rejects 
transhumanism as a whole (see: FIAMC 2013) by pointing out the possible 
dehumanizing effect it may have, as well as the hubristic desire to remake 
God’s creation according to one’s preference. However, it is worth noting that 
Christian thinkers did not – and do not – dismiss the notion of enhancing 
human nature entirely and without some reservations. The tome edited by 
Ronald Cole-Turner proves to the latter by gathering a vast collection of both 





historical and modern Christian theological voices in favor of human 
enhancement and transhumanism.  
Christianity and transhumanism in historical perspective 
The historical research is conducted mostly in the parts written by 
Michael S. Burdett and David Grumett. In the chapter “Contextualizing a 
Christian Perspective on Transcendence and Human Enhancement”, Burdett 
explores the philosophical ideas developed by Francis Bacon, Nikolai 
Fyodorovich Fedorov, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, which – as he proves – 
may be seen as a historical Christian foundation for modern transhumanism. As 
noted on the transhumanist claims present in the thinking of aforementioned 
philosophers:  
It is apparent that there is a tradition within Christian history 
that does not see the enhancement of humanity through 
technological means as a particular problem. As we have seen, 
Bacon advises that his new science would mitigate the effects of 
the Fall and enhance humanity’s dominion over the world. 
Fedorov claims that death is the ultimate enemy of humanity and 
that its limitation through technological resurrection should be 
the aim of humanity and the Christian. Teilhard de Chardin 
encourages the use of technology to enhance humanity, because 
he believes that each biological step is advancing toward the 
cosmic Christ (Burdett 2013, 32). 
A more complex insight into possible transhumanist notions in Teilhard de 
Chardin’s philosophy are given by David Grumett. British theologian not only 
pinpoints the well-known influence Teilhard de Chardin had on Julian Huxley – 
author of the term “posthuman” – but also unveils seven concepts and ideas 
developed mutually by the early 20th century French Jesuit and modern 
proponents of transhumanism, such as Ray Kurzweil or Nick Bostrom. This 
leads Grumett to ascerting that – both Teilhard de Chardin’s and 
transhumanists’ – “vision of technology contributing to the realization of God’s 
purpose for the world does not imply naive approval of every technical 
innovation or process. Instead, it helps to establish a normative standard 
against which these can and should be judged” (Grumett 2013, 43). It is 
possible to assert that – to some extent – the proponents of transhumanism do 
acknowledge some form of metaphysic (as noted by Grumett: “In transhumanist 
discourse, the moral ends that humans should pursue are set within a general 
metaphysics” (2013, 42), and therefore would accept the notion of a divine 





Christian ethics and transhumanism 
In the succeeding chapters the notions of human and posthuman dignity are 
being discussed, as well as the relations between transhumanism and the ideas 
of Christian sin, hope, and gender. Karen Lebacqz dedicated her text to 
exploring how the concept of human dignity is being constructed in Christian 
theology and ethics, and attempts to develop a critical understanding whether 
the competing concept of posthuman dignity, developed explicitly by Nick 
Bostrom (2005), may be seen as logically sound and worthwhile. After 
recapitulating the different stances on dignity present in transhumanist and 
bioconservative thought, Lebacqz makes an attempt on answering the 
question whether an autonomous Christian response to the notion of 
enhancement exists – one that would practically differ from those given by 
Bostrom on one hand and Kass on the other. “Christian theology is at root a 
«Creation–Fall–Redemption» theology. (…) Within this story, many themes 
related to the Creation and Fall evoke the notion that limits should be set on 
human striving and hence, possibly, on enhancement efforts. (…) I argue that 
Redemption trumps Creation and Fall and therefore permits some latitude for 
enhancement” (Lebacqz 2013, 55). This response leads Lebacqz directly to 
assuming that “there is reason to embrace enhancement that takes away pain, 
death, and limits on human life” (Lebacqz 2013, 58). Although it may seem 
counterintuitive at first, the American theologian gives several reasons for such 
an interpretation, e.g. the presage given in the Book of Revelation that in the 
final days a new Earth and new Heaven shall be restored, in which there will be 
no more pain and dying. Thus, concludes Lebacqz, the reason for enhancing 
human nature. 
To a different moral aspect points Ted Peters in his chapter “Progress 
and Provolution. Will Transhumanism Leave Sin Behind?”. Although declaring 
himself sympathetic towards transhumanism – and techno-enthusiasts 
altogether – as they embrace one of the most precious gifts from God: creativity 
and desire to transform, he states that a reasonable level of caution towards 
transhumanist claims is needed: “An item of looming significance is missing 
from this [transhumanist] vision: a realistic appreciation for the depth and 
pervasiveness of what theologians call sin. As sinful creatures, we humans 
never lose our capacity to tarnish what is shiny, to undo what has been done, to 
corrupt what is pure” (Peters 2013, 64). Peters aim is thus to provide a 
schematics for how the transhumanist goal – the posthuman future – may be 
attained and whether it is actually worth achieving. The conclusions Peters 
draws are not as optimistic as those of Bostrom or Savulescu; the 
transhumanist ethics – he argues – is torn between a tension between 
biological and economic concepts of rivalry and “survival of the fittest”, and an 
altruistic and benevolent hope for a better, more-than-humane future. 
Furthermore, most transhumanists renounce religion as an atavistic and 
conservative concept. Peters believes that – due to this fact – they are unable to 





notice the difference between technological and eschatological immortality. 
Thus, the notion of progress becomes problematic, as it is being renounced 
both by natural sciences and theology: “Many leading evolutionary theorists – 
including Ernst Mayr, Stephen Jay Gould, and Francisco Ayala – refute the notion 
that progress is built into the process of evolutionary change. (…)The 
ambiguity [of progress] of which Niebuhr speaks is the ever-present potential 
created by human freedom, namely, the potential to choose evil and chaos 
along with what is good and fulfilling” (Peters 2013, 78-79). The conclusion for 
Peters is thus obvious: improving certain human capacities (e.g. those linked to 
long and healthy life) is acceptable, whereas other should be greeted with 
caution and severely limited. 
A different topic is discussed by Stephen Garner. Concentrating on the 
technological rather than biological aspect of transhumanist thought, notably 
on the cybernetic organisms and their relation to religion. A ‘cyborg’ may be 
defined as an organism “typically human, that has had technological artifacts 
added to its physical being” (Garner 2013, 88). Those artifacts may range from 
well-known and raising few debates synthetic hip replacements, pacemakers, 
and heart valves, to highly sophisticated and controversial brain implants, 
synthetic muscle tissues, and many other. In such sense, it is possible – along 
with Donna Haraway – to assume that modern people, interacting constantly 
with technological artifacts and forming bonds with them, are in fact cyborgs to 
some extent. The question that arises concerns whether such a hybrid 
organism has a predefined space in Christian theology. Garner brings here the 
account of Philip Hefner and Anne Kull, who firmly agree that humanity – as 
being a “created cocreator” – is capable of transgressing it’s biological 
limitations and become a hybrid. It is also possible – they argue – to assume 
that Jesus Christ was an ultimate cyborg: demi-human and demi-god. Thus, Kull 
argues that it is impossible to separate physiological and cognitive 
enhancement from one another. A further notion is given on how Christians 
assume themselves being “citizens of Heaven”, although they live on a different 
– earthly – plain of existence. From such accounts, Garner argues that there 
exists a well-grounded tradition for hybridity and cyborgs in Christian theology, 
one that requires “avenues – in communities of faith, in the academy, and in the 
public square – for raising, discussing, and answering these questions so as to 
provide hope in the face of this tension between awe and anxiety” as “hope 
arises from the theological reflection of the tension between wonder and 
anxiety, as each informs the other, and drives to the fore essential questions 
about human technological agency” (Garner 2013, 98). 
An even more critical reception of transhumanism is present in 
research of Jeanine Thweatt-Bates on gender. The feminist theologian, adhering 
to the understanding of cyborgs developed by Donna Haraway, points out “the 
significant differences between the cyborg and transhumanist posthuman 





the transhumanists tend to embrace an anthropological dualism, 
whereas the «cyberfeminists» embrace a strong materialism. (…) 
the fact that those engaged in doing Christian theological 
anthropology have recently begun to appreciate that embodiment 
opens the door to a theological understanding of the posthuman 
(…) might helpfully critique the problematic aspects of 
transhumanist anthropology, including gender (Thweatt-Bates 
2013, 101) 
The fundamental objection towards transhumanist anthropology, developed by 
Thweatt-Bates, is thus following: Transhumanists wish to transcend biological 
constraints (including those of sex/gender) through a controlled enhancement 
of human capabilities. The posthuman will therefore be able to manifest 
physiological aspects of either sex, enabling him to live a better, fuller life. 
However, “in the transhumanist postgender future, bodies may indeed be 
multiply gendered, but persons will not be” (Thweatt-Bates 2013, 104). The 
posthuman will seemingly be able to choose from the variety of different 
gender roles and traits and mold them freely into whatever he desires – 
although a prerequisite state of androgyny is required. Thus the promotion of 
artificial insemination and artificial pregnancy, that would free the posthuman 
from the “evil, seductive and limiting biological matter”. As Thweatt-Bates 
points out, this view resembles firmly the Platonic idealistic anthropology; one 
that has been already vastly discussed in theological debates over past 
centuries. Thus the liberating case of Christian body theology becomes fully 
understandable: it offers a well-grounded insight into how and why Platonic 
idealistic philosophy may impose negative constraints on human development. 
Transhumanism and Christian theology  
The notion of transcending biological limitations is discussed also by Celia 
Deane-Drummond. The desire to part ways with our human physiological and 
cognitive fragility is one that preoccupies the thoughts of such transhumanist 
thinkers as Nick Bostrom or John Harris. The latter envisages that – through 
scientific progress – prolonged life expectancy, along with obliteration of 
human vulnerability to diseases and removal of psychological, subjective 
suffering, are the unavoidable consequence of progress. These hopes, although 
alluring, do possess certain drawbacks: they require technologies that are yet to 
be discovered, tested, and mastered in order to provide a stable source for 
posthuman future. And since the use of human subjects in biomedical testing is 
severely limited, animal subjects will probably remain the sole source of 
“testing material”. This leads to assuming that not only “posthuman” but also 
“postanimal” are the future of the biosphere. This vision remains uneasy. 
Through a careful reception of the philosophy of Augustine of Hippo, along 
with Plato, Descartes, Heidegger, and Paul W. Taylor, Celia Deane-Drummond 
declares: “For these kinds of thinkers, and I count myself as broadly belonging 





among them, transhuman philosophy of the type peddled by Bostrom fails not 
just because it seems to promote disconnection within the self (mind and 
body), while offering a materialistic atheism, but also because it promotes 
disconnection between selves” (Deane-Drummond 2013, 123). An alternative 
to transhumanism future is given; one that embraces the need for treating non-
human animals in a subjective manner, and thus embraces the biological – as 
well as the cognitive – dimension of personhood and humanity. 
The concept of prolonged life is discussed specifically in the chapter 
“Chasing Methuselah” by Todd T. W. Daly. The prolonged lifespan of human 
species, being undoubtedly an effect of progress in medical and biological 
sciences, does not come without moral doubts from some conservative thinkers 
– while transhumanism embraces this concept as its core statement. Preserving 
human body from decay and death is not, however, an idea invented recently; 
Daly dates it to the writings of Saint Athanasius of Alexandria, and later 
developed by Karl Barth. The ancient doctor of the Church assumed that – if the 
body is in perfect submission to the soul, and the soul is totally devoted to God 
– it is possible to postpone aging and death. This notion has been also discussed 
by Barth, who arrives at interesting conclusions: Jesus Christ was the one true 
human – “embodied soul and besouled body” – whose existence was thus in 
perfect harmony. As humans, however, “we allow our body and soul to «go 
their separate ways,» and thus allow the drives of the body to have undue 
influence on the soul. (…) One of the main characteristics of this body/soul 
disorder, says Barth, is dissatisfaction with our current life span” (Daly 2013, 
138). In consequence, as capable of sin, we wish to extend our lifespan through 
technological means, distancing ourselves from the Creation and rendering our 
struggles hopeless. To conquer death, Christianity believes, is to accept it and 
put faith in God, whom – in his unlimited grace – shall grant us with a long and 
full life. 
To a less spectacular, but nonetheless controversial aspect of 
transhumanism points Michael Spezio, namely that of enhancing human 
cognitive and emotional capacities. As Spezio argues, transhumanists 
demonstrate a negative stance towards emotions, as they believe that strong 
and negative emotions (such as anger, anxiety, or grief) make humanity weak 
and vulnerable. Thus the need to eliminate – or at least suppress – such 
emotions is needed in order to truly enhance human conditions. Spezio, 
however, tends to the opposite: “Emotion makes us strong, not weak. 
Eliminating emotion will make us less human, not more human or rational, and 
certainly not transhuman in any sense of that word that is close to what the 
strongest advocates of transhumanism envision” (Spezio 2013, 146-147). The 
need for suppressing negative emotions (e.g. those linked with PTSD) may 
seem intuitively desirable; yet Spezio demonstrates at this point the theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who “as one who took seriously the need to see humans 





anthropology. [This aspect] provides useful and reasoned opposition to 
transhumanist views that have an unrealistic or anemic view of the human and 
of the complexity of human society” (Spezio 2013, 152). The relational aspect 
of human behavior is constituted on our emotional life both in its positive and 
negative dimension. “Liberating” ourselves from certain emotions would in fact 
pauperize humanity rather than enrich it, since purely rational reasoning does 
not enable such morally valuable attitudes as empathizing with others – 
concludes Spezio. 
In the following chapter “Whose Salvation? Which Eschatology? 
Transhumanism and Christianity as Contending Salvific Religions” by Brent 
Waters, the notion of transhumanism as a secular religion is discussed. As 
Waters assumes, transhumanism perceives modern biological human condition 
as limiting and thus should be overcome – as humanity has been up until now 
been overcoming other biological restraints. In effect, the posthuman future is 
something that is not only desirable for itself, but also a future that falls into a 
logic of universal and teleological progress and one which may be perceived as 
the fruit of humanity struggles. In a world that permits a lifespan of over two 
centuries, the need for an eschatological hope is thus severely diminished. Such 
hope, however, is false, claims Waters, taking as an example Max More’s 
philosophy of human enhancement: “More’s salvific scheme is quixotic. (…) He 
believes that individuals can refashion themselves into the kind of beings they 
want to become (…). His ideal self exemplifies the autonomous individual, 
which means that he is appealing to a historically conditioned tradition rather 
than any so-called pure rationality. The eventual posthuman, then, is little more 
than a hyperlibertarian” (Waters 2013, 169). In effect, More’s faith in 
posthumanity offers nothing more than the successful application of modern 
technologies into liberating schemes known since Robert Nozick’s "genetic 
supermarket." "Christian theology cannot embrace the transhumanist salvific 
strategy and eschatological horizon for reasons that are similar to its earlier 
rejection of the Manichean and Pelagian heresies", as Waters concludes (Waters 
2013, 170-171), namely the Manichean vilification of material body and the 
Pelagian belief in the human self-perfecting capabilities.  
In the two final chapters, Gerald McKenny and Ronald Cole-Turner 
discuss precisely how does Christian transcendence and transhumanism link 
with each other. What is important to note is the fact that both Christian 
theology and transhumanism embrace the claim that superhuman capacities – 
those which transcend human nature – are of intrinsic worth and thus should 
be pursued not only as means to an end, but as ends in themselves. However, 
the difference lies whether such aims are attainable and at what cost. As noted 
by McKenny: 
transhumanists and humanistic naturalists are in agreement that 
the enjoyment of goods that transcend our natural human 
capacities must come at the cost of these capacities and therefore 





of our humanity. (…) It is just this assumption, however, that 
Christian theology rejects in its conception of communion with 
God. (…) Moreover, although these capacities must be extended in 
order to enjoy this good, it is the gift of divine grace that extends 
them, and not a technological enhancement (…). Finally, although 
the ultimate good exceeds human capacities, it is still a human 
good, a good for humans, and the external transcendence made 
possible by divine grace, far from denigrating humanity, is what 
makes it possible to enjoy this good, which infinitely exceeds and 
overwhelms our capacities, while we remain human (McKenny 
2013, 184-185). 
A parallel concept of perfectionism (self-development) and meliorism 
(technological enhancing interventions) has been also developed by Catholic 
German philosopher Robert Spaemann (1999). In consequence, both authors 
defend the view that human nature “as it exists today was not created in its 
present form”. That is why they dismiss the belief that “human nature should 
be seen as fixed and final and that it is either impossible or inherently immoral 
to try to change it” (Cole-Turner 2013, 193-194). Although Christian 
theologians share altogether the critique of transhumanism – as cited above – 
yet they do present different stances on whether and to what extent are human 
capable of transcending themselves. This matter proves to yet be developed in a 
more deep and full manner. 
Conclusion 
To assert that transhumanism has no links to religion or transcendence is 
obviously false. As shown by the aforementioned authors, however, these 
relations surpass simple statements that transhumanism is a form of modern 
laic religion. The numerous ways in which transhumanist thinkers both derive 
from Christian theology and philosophy, and are critically received by 
theologians and religion philosophers, provide a broad and stimulating insight 
into contexts that often remain underexplored or even unidentified. 
References 
Bostrom, N. 2004. “Transhumanism: The World’s Most Dangerous Idea?” 
Foreign Policy October 19. URL: 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/dangerous.html. 
Bostrom, N. 2005. “In Defence of Posthuman Dignity.” Bioethics 19(3): 202-214. 
Burdett, M. S. 2013. “Contextualizing a Christian Perspective on Transcendence 
and Human Enhancement.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and 
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement. 





Cole-Turner, R. 2013. “Transhumanism and Christianity.” In: Cole-Turner, R. 
(Ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of 
Technological Enhancement. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press: 193-203. 
Daly, T. 2013. “Chasing Methuselah. Transhumanism and Christian Theosis in 
Critical Perspective.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and 
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 131-144. 
Deane-Drummond, C. 2013. “Taking Leave of the Animal? The Theological and 
Ethical Implications of Transhuman Projects.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) 
Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of 
Technological Enhancement. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press: 115-130. 
Fukuyama, F. 2009. “Transhumanism.” Foreign Policy October 23. URL: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/23/transhumanism/. 
FIAMC. 2013. Madrid Declaration on Science and Life. URL: 
http://www.fiamc.org/bioethics/madrid-declaration-on-science-life/. 
Garner, S. 2013. “The Hopeful Cyborg.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism 
and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological 
Enhancement. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 87-100. 
Grumett, D. 2013. “Transformation and the End of Enhancement.” In: Cole-
Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in 
an Age of Technological Enhancement. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press: 37-49. 
Lebacqz, K. 2013. “Dignity and Enhancement in the Holy City.” In: Cole-Turner, 
R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of 
Technological Enhancement. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press: 51-62. 
McKenny, G. 2013. “Transcendence, Technological Enhancement, and Christian 
Theology.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: 
Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 177-192. 
Peters, T. 2013. “Progress and Provolution. Will Transhumanism Leave Sin 
Behind?” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: 
Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 63-86. 
Spaemann, R. 1999. “Genetic Manipulation of Human Nature in the Context of 
Human Personality.” In: de Dios Vial Correa, J., Sgreccia, E. (Eds.) Human 
Genome, Human Person and the Society of the Future: Proceedings of the 
fourth Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life. Vatican City: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana: 340-352. 
Spezio, M. 2013. “Human or Vulcan? Theological Consideration of Emotional 
Control Enhancement.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and 





Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press: 145-162. 
Thweatt-Bates, J. J. 2013. “Artificial Wombs and Cyborg Births”. In: Cole-Turner, 
R. (Ed.) Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of 
Technological Enhancement. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press: 101-114. 
Waters, B. 2013. “Whose Salvation? Which Eschatology? Transhumanism and 
Christianity as Contending Salvific Religions.” In: Cole-Turner, R. (Ed.) 
Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of 
















Abstract: Review of the book edited by R. Cole-Turner Transhumanism and 
Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement. 
 
 
Keywords: transhumanism, theology, transcendence, Christianity, Bostrom. 
 
Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 6 (2015). No. 1, pp. 153–163. 
 
doi: 10.14746/eip.2015.2.9 
